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1 Introduction
There is a long-standing perception of a fundamental conflict between the interests of busi-
ness and environmental regulators. In many cases regulators apply policies that increase
production costs, restrict production, or otherwise constrain the actions of firms. There
is a rich literature chronicling the impacts that regulations such as the clean air act have
had on industrial activity.1 With greenhouse gas regulation on the horizon in the US, and
already under way in the European Union, the question of the impacts of these regulations
on industry has taken center stage. As countries and regions around the world develop
policies for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, there is an understandably great in-
terest in how these policies will impact the competitiveness, productivity, and profitability
of the industries to which they are applied.
Measuring the economic impacts of GHG regulations obviously has direct relevance to
setting the levels and timings of the regulations. Even setting aside the specific goals for
GHG reductions, information about the overall magnitude and distribution of economic
impacts has importance for the policy-making process. This is most starkly true in the case
of cap-and-trade mechanisms, which create valuable new property rights in the form of
emissions allowances or permits. These permits constitute the “currency” of cap and trade
markets. They also provide an important tool to policy makers for distributing the revenues
collected by the carbon regulation. The process of allocating emissions allowaances, while
inevitably containing a strong element of political maneuvering, is usually grounded in a
desire to offset some of the cost impacts of the introduction of carbon regulation. Industries
that claim to bear the brunt of the abatement costs usually stake the largest claim to
allocations of allowances.
However, for most industrial enterprises, changes in direct abatement costs are only
one piece of a complicated profitability puzzle. The introduction of a price of CO2 into
an economy can have indirect impacts on firms that are not large CO2 emitters. In most
1Gray (1987), Becker and Henderson (2002), Gray and Shadbegian (2003), List, et al. (2004).
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industries, increases in CO2 costs will be reflected in output prices, and therefore revenues,
as well as in costs. A more complete picture of these net impacts is necessary in any attempt
to align allocations to the true economic impacts of CO2 regulation on firms.
Indeed, the impact of regulations on profitability is ambiguous, even when those reg-
ulations have a substantial impact of costs. There are several mechanisms, ranging from
restricting entry (e.g. Ryan, 2007) to raising rivals’ costs (e.g. Puller, 2005) through which
revenue increases can outstrip cost increases, enhancing profitability.2 With cap-and-trade
regulations, the free allocation of emissions allowances adds an additional source of rev-
enue. In the case of GHG markets, these assets can total hundreds of billions of dollars.
Despite the politically motivated tendency to award emissions allowances proportion-
ally to emissions, several papers have concluded that this likely amounts to overcompen-
sation of the affected industries. These papers use various simulation methodologies to
forecast potential impacts of carbon taxes or caps. Bovenberg and Goulder (2001) and
Goulder, et. al (2009) utilize general equilibrium models to assess the likely impacts of a
carbon tax and various cap-and trade policies on a wide set of industries. Burtraw and
Palmer (2008) simulate the US electricity sector under potential cap-and-trade scenarios.
Smale et al. (2006) simulate several industries under a carbon cap in Europe using an
assumption of Cournot competition. All these studies find that for many industries, com-
pensation of less than 20 percent of emissions would offset the profitability impacts of
regulation.
In this paper we study impacts on firms of the largest, in monetary terms, cap-and-
trade market in the world - the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) for
CO2. This is, to date, the most significant effort by far at regulating CO2 emissions in the
world. As a role model for carbon cap-and-trade, the ETS has been closely scrutinized
both within and outside the European Union. From the outset, the relative impact of
2For example, Ryan (2007) demonstrates how the Clean Air Act significantly increased the sunk cost
of entry in the Portland cement industry. Puller (2006) demonstrates how firms can profit from increased
regulation by raising rival’s costs, leading them to promote the adoption of those regulations.
3
the ETS on EU industries has been a controversial topic, one that has strongly influenced
policies for the allocation of emissions allowances. During its first phase of operation from
2005 through 2007, the prices of emissions allowances in the EU market were quite volatile.
While this volatility has sparked criticism about the design and implementation of this
phase of the market, we take advantage of it in order to examine the impact of CO2 prices
on firms.
Rather than attempting to directly untangle the many competing effects of the ETS
on firms, we focus on the stock market valuations of public-traded firms subject to CO2
regulation. Specifically, we examine the impact of a sharp devaluation in CO2 prices in
late April 2006 as an event study on the share prices of affected firms. Such an exercise
can be interpreted in several ways. Under an assumption of fundamental market valuation
these prices should reflect the market’s expected discounted future profits of the firms.
Even if one does not adhere to an assumption that the market fully reflects expectations
of future profitability, the event provides a useful window into the beliefs of the market
about the impacts of movements in CO2 prices.
Our results imply that rather than being hurt by the imposition of CO2 regulation,
several industrial sectors benefited from the ETS. Indeed the sharpest declines in equity
prices occur within industries that are the most carbon intensive, or electricity intensive.
Such a response indicates that CO2 prices play a significant role in determining product
prices and revenues in many of these industries. We also examine the responses in relation
to a measure of international trade exposure, and find weak evidence that the benefits of
higher CO2 prices were concentrated amongst sectors with little exposure to international
trade.
In section ??, we develop a simple model of the impacts of CO2 costs on firm prof-
itability in order to illustrate the potential impacts. In section ??, we briefly review the
EU CO2 market and its pricing from 2005-07 and examine the impact of the crash in
permit prices in late April 2006. In section ??, we examine the underlying elements of
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firm characteristics that influenced the response to the change in CO2 prices. We conclude
in section ??.
2 Emissions Regulations and Firm Profits
In this section we develop a theoretical model considering the potential impacts of envi-
ronmental regulation, or more specifically emissions costs, on firm profitability and per-
formance. The model provides a useful framework for decomposing and illustrating the
various potential impacts, both positive and negative, of emissions costs on firms. Consider
a firm producing products for a market represented by the demand curve, P (Q), where Q
represents total industry production in this market. The firm is subject to cap-and-trade
regulation of its emissions, which are in turn a function of its emissions rate, r, and its
total production, q. We assume that the production technology determines the emissions
rate, r(q) and that this rate cannot be changed over the time horizon we are considering.
The per-unit price of emissions allowances is τ , resulting in direct compliance costs of
τr(q)q. However, the firm may posses allowances A equal to its initial allocation less net
sales. Considering both input and environmental costs, the profits of this firm, i, can be
represented as
pii = P (Q)qi − Ci(qi, ω) + τAi − τri(qi)qi
where the function Ci(qi, ω) represents the total cost of producing q with a vector of input
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For firms with market power in their product market, we can also consider the effect
on product prices to be a combination of changes in their own output and the output of













where q 6=i is the output of all other firms, q 6=i = Q− qi.
Assume firms maximize profits with respect to q. Define pi∗i = pii(q
∗
i , q6=i). For shocks
that have marginal influence on qi, the envelope theorem implies,
∂pi∗i
∂qi
= P + P ′q∗i −
∂C
∂q
− (r′q∗i + r) τ = 0. (2)
In other words, the change in profitability though own output would be negligible.
However, there are still effects relating to direct costs, the value of allowance holdings, and
changes in market prices due to the responses of other firms in the industry. Combining











+ A− rq∗i . (3)
The individual terms in equation (??) illustrate the competing potential effects of a
change in the allowance price. First, revenues may increase due to the fact that other
firms in the industry have collectively responded by reducing output. This is similar to
a “raising rivals’ costs” effect.3 Under the assumption that firms would reduce output in
the face of an increase in allowance costs, this term would be positive. Second, the middle
term on the right hand side of (??) captures the impact of changes in input costs due to a
change in the allowance price. To the extent that these inputs (e.g. electricity) come from
industries that are themselves subject to the environmental regulation, this term would
presumably be negative. The last term, A − rq reflects the change in direct compliance
costs of a change in allowance prices. If a firm is “short” in allowances, then A < rq and
this term would be negative.
3Salop and Scheffman, 1983
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The model is intended to be general, encompassing both perfectly competitive indus-
tries and those in which individual firms have market power. However, it is important
to also acknowledge aspects of oligopoly competition that are not explicitly represented
within this framework. In oligopoly settings, cost shocks such as environmental regulations
can increase profitability by increasing the severity of market power in an industry. In a
dynamic setting, the environmental regulation could serve as a barrier to entry or even as
a collusive focal point. Even in a static setting, the imposition of an environmental tax
can increase margins under certain demand structures (Seade, 1985).
In the following sections, we will examine each of these potential effects empirically.
The relative magnitudes of these effects will largely depend upon three key factors, the
elasticity of demand for the firm’s product, the firm’s endowment of permits, and the
relationship between a firm’s marginal cost and its average cost with respect to emissions
and other input prices. Figure 1 helps to illustrate these factors. We assume here that
a firm faces a residual demand curve D, and has a marginal cost function cτ1 before the
imposition, or increase, in allowance prices. In this we figure, we also assume that the
residual demand curve D for this firm is unaffected by a change in allowance prices, one
condition for which is that all of the firm’s competitors operate outside of the capped
region.
The classic analysis of the incidence of taxation on such a firm would imply a vertical
shift of the marginal cost curve to cτ2. In the context of environmental regulation, this
is equivalent to assuming that emissions rates are constant for all production quantities.
If true the producer surplus is clearly reduced from the sum of areas B and C to the
area A in figure 1a. The allocation of revenues collected, or of permits, would then be
critical in determining the net effect of the regulation. If the firm received a free allocation
equivalent to 100% of its ex-post emissions, this would be a transfer equivalent to the areas
C and D, which totally offsets the increased regulatory cost. As long as the demand for
product is sufficiently inelastic, the firm’s net profit improves because its revenue increases
without any increase in environmental costs. Indeed as Bovenberg and Goulder (2001)
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demonstrate, only a relatively small allocation of emissions allowances is necessary to fully
compensate many industries for changes in profits due to CO2 costs.
However, even without an allocation of allowances, the impact on firm profits can be
ambiguous. This is due to the fact that there are both heterogeneous firms and production
technologies within most industries. Consider a case where emissions rates are increasing
with production quantities, as illustrated in figure 1b. The increase in allowance costs now
raises marginal costs, and therefore prices in this perfectly competitive circumstance. The
increase in average costs is well below the increase in marginal costs, however. Now the
new producer surplus, area A, could be larger than the previous surplus of B and C. A
similar, even larger, effect could arise if an individual firm happens to have a “cleaner”
technology than its rivals. Such a circumstance would have the effect of decreasing the
residual elasticity of demand for the clean firm. Again product prices could rise much
faster than average production costs.
Of course, such an effect strongly depends upon the fact that much of the incidence of
increased emissions costs are being passed on to consumers. If the firm in question were
instead faced with very elastic demand for its product, even a substantial convexity in the
marginal cost curve could not compensate for the fact that the producer is absorbing the
bulk of the emissions cost increase (figure 1c).
This discussion is meant to illustrate the varied potential effects and emphasize the
importance of several key industry characteristics in determining the net effects of envi-
ronmental regulations. In the following section, we develop several proxy variables meant
to reflect these characteristics in order to examine the market return of individual firms
and industries in response to a substantial decline in emissions costs.
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3 The EU Emissions Trading System
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) was developed as one of the central mechanisms
for which the European Union member states could achieve compliance with the commit-
ments under the Kyoto treaty and is in many ways a remarkable accomplishment. The
world’s first significant cap-and-trade system for CO2, the ETS covers over a dozen indus-
tries and 27 countries, including several that took on no Kyoto obligations. The ETS has
been rolled out in phases. The first phase, running from 2005 through 2007, was intended
as much to develop institutions and gain regulatory experience as to achieve substantial
CO2 reductions. The overall cap for the market was an aggregation of caps developed by
each participating country through their “national allocation plans,” previously analyzed
by Betz et al. (2004). The EU established guidelines for the development of these plans,
but member states were left with significant latitude. Efforts at setting an appropriate cap
were complicated by the fact that, prior to 2005, the monitoring of CO2 emissions of many
facilities and countries was unreliable at best. Caps were supposed to be set in a manner
that would place emissions reductions on a trajectory consistent with meeting the Kyoto
targets. However, the effective stringency of the Kyoto targets varies greatly amongst
EU member states, and the implementation plans themselves reflected large differences in
these goals, as well as in the relative weight countries chose to give to the capped sectors
covered by the ETS as opposed to those sectors counted under Kyoto but not under the
ETS.
A second source of diversity amongst participating nations was their relative approach
to assigning permits to the covered sectors. As chronicled in Ellerman and Buchner (2008),
Kettner et al. (2008), and Joskow and Ellerman (2008), countries such as Spain, Italy, and
the UK appear to have imposed more stringent caps and as a consequence the affected
industries in these countries, particularly in the power sector, were allocated few permits
than their observed emissions. These firms were therefore net buyers of permits within the
EU. Industries in other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, were observed to emit
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far less than their allocations.
Another important contrast lay in the allocation of permits across the various industrial
sectors. Although there were differences in countries’ approaches to the allocation of
permits to their industries, some common themes emerge. In general, many regulated firms
in the manufacturing sectors received more permits than they subsequently needed to cover
their observed emissions. Those providing power and heat, most notably electricity firms,
were generally “short” of permits, but still received allocations equivalent to a substantial
majority of their emissions.
Overall, by the end of phase I, available permits exceeded measured emissions by about
2.8%. Although the eventual surplus in permits led to a perception of intentionally lax
regulation through “over-allocation,” the picture is more nuanced. An ex-post realization
of a surplus does not necessarily imply over-allocation, since a surplus of allowances can
arise from either over-allocation or over-abatement. Since emissions prices were quite high
for some of this period, it is natural to expect some abatement to have occurred, at least
while emission prices were high. Studies by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) as well as De-
larue et al. (2008) indicate that at least some abatement did take place. In addition,
macro-economic and weather shocks may have played a role in lower than expected emis-
sions, and specific directed regulations such as aggressive subsidies for renewable electricity
production may have been sufficient to tip the market into surplus.4 Importantly, none of
this was known for much of the first phase, and it was only after the phase was more than
2/3 complete that the surplus conditions pushed emissions prices to near zero.
3.1 ETS Market Performance
The most notorious aspect of the ETS during phase I was the volatility of the permit
prices, which was greatly exacerbated by the fact that permits could not be “banked” for
use beyond 2007. The ETS market was characterized by an early period in which prices
4See Convery et al. (2008).
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were higher than anticipated and a later period in which the price eventually reached zero
in the face of a surplus of permits that held no value beyond 2007. From the onset of trading
in January through March 2006, prices rose steadily to over 30 Euro/ton. While this price
rise appears somewhat surprising in hindsight, given the eventual surplus of permits, it
was not necessarily considered anomalous at the time. Many attribute the relatively high
prices during this phase to the fact that prices for natural gas, which largely defines the
marginal costs of reducing CO2 emissions in the power sector through its substitution
for coal, were steadily rising during this period.5 In addition, while firms from countries
“short” on permits were apparently relatively active in trading from the beginning, those
from many “long” eastern European countries were not due to delays in integrating the
regulatory platforms with that of the EU. This may have contributed to masking what
later emerged to be a surplus of available permits.
The lack of reliable information about aggregate emissions was also a critical contrib-
utor to the uncertainty about price levels. This changed on April 25, 2006 when the first
reports of country level emissions began to leak into the permit market. As can be seen in
Figure 2, the reaction was dramatic. Over the next few days, the permit price as reported
on the European Climate Exchange fell from 28 Euros/ton on April 25 to 14 Euros/ton
on April 28. The price drop hit both phase I permit prices as well as permits covering
phase II, which had begun trading in 2006. In fact, the surpluses reported during those
periods were not reflective of the more modest surplus left at the end of phase I, and even
these initial reports were revised shortly after they were made public. By May 15, when
the final emissions totals were officially released, phase I prices had rebounded and then
fallen slightly again to settle around 16 Euros/ton.
During this one month period, the general movements of prices for both the phase I and
phase II permits had been generally consistent with each other, although the magnitudes
were more muted in the case of the longer-term phase II permits. Later in 2006 the two
prices series diverged for good, with the phase I prices starting a steady decline toward
5Joskow and Ellerman, 2008.
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zero and the phase II series settling into a range around 20 Euros/ton.
3.2 Equity Market Effects
We now turn to the question of how the sharp devaluation in permit prices in April 2006
impacted expectations about firm profitability. A few papers have empirically looked
at different segments of the EU market. Sijm, et al. (2006) examine the implications
specifically for electricity prices in the Netherlands and Germany and find substantial
pass-through of carbon cost. Convery, et. al. (2008) note that net incomes of several large
electricity producers increased throughout phase I of the ETS. Two similar papers, Veith,
et al. (2009), and Oberndorfer (2009) (2009) examine stock market returns of electricity
companies using a panel regression of share prices on CO2 prices throughout the phase
I period. Both find that share prices of large electricity producers who were regulated
under the ETS were positively linked with prices for CO2. However, Veith, et al., find that
share prices of “clean” electricity producers not covered under the ETS had no significant
response to CO2 prices.
In this paper we also utilize equity prices of publicly traded firms. It is important
to note that many firms directly subject to the CO2 cap, as well as those in impacted
industries, are privately held or government owned. A large number of publicly traded
firms were also effected, however, and we focus our attention on these firms. We employ a
standard event-study approach.6 We examine firms contained in the Dow Jones STOXX
600 index, which is similar to the S&P 500 but covers European firms.7 We focus on
the three days after the initial leak of permit market information, the daily returns for
April 26-28. Several papers have utilized an event study approach to assess the impact of
environmental regulation on firm profits, including Kahn and Knittel (2002), Linn (2006)
and Linn (2009). Because this approach has usually utilized a political or legal decision
6Fama et al., 1969; more recent surveys include Brown and Warner, 1985, and MacKinlay, 1997
7We chose this index because of its breadth of firms and of geography. Other commonly cited European
Indices such as the FTSE 100 and the DAX are more limited in coverage of European countries and
industries.
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as the “event,” a common concern has been that information may have leaked into the
market before the examined event date. Here we can be confident here that there was little
leakage of information as this information would have impacted the CO2 price, which was
steadily rising up until our event date.
We utilize the following specification for investigating the potential for extraordinary
returns during this event window.
ln(Si,t/Si,t−1) = αi + βi ln(Mt/Mt−1) + γiEV ENTt + i,t (4)
where Si,t is the share price of firm i and Mt is the price of the market index at time
t, and EV ENTt is a dummy variable that is scaled according to the length of the event
window. For our base specification, where the event window is 3 days, EV ENTt will be
scaled by 1/3 so that gammai represents the cumulative excess return during the event
window.
We run regression (??) for each stock in the index individually, and aggregate individual
γi to summarize results by industry categories. We perform this aggregation through the
following regression.
γ̂i = θj + εi ∀ i ∈ j. (5)
Industrial categories j are based upon NAICS 2 digit classifications.8 Intuitively, the
coefficient value θj therefore represents the average effect of all firm specific impacts within
each industry sector.
Table 1 summarizes the event effects by industrial classification. Many of the largest
significant declines were registered in industries that feature prominently in the EU ETS,
8These data are provided by Compustat. Thompsons Datastream provides a classification called INDM
which provides similar results as the 2-digit NAICS, but NAICS was chosen because it is more widely used
in the literature and because it is more easily linked to other industrial characteristics discussed below.
However, Weiner (2005) evaluates several industrial classification schemes and finds drawbacks in each.
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including Mining and Oil & Gas Extraction and Utilities. However, there are also notable
declines in such industries as Real Estate, Accommodation & Food Services, and Construc-
tion. As we describe below, each of these industries are relatively large users of electricity
and sell to relatively local markets. The largest increase was in Wholesale Trade.
These results are merely meant to summarize general effects. The groupings in Table
1 are somewhat problematic, as classifications can be imperfect and there can be consider-
able heterogeneity of firms within a classification. This latter fact is highlighted by Table
2, which summarizes the effects for firms contained in the Electricity sector, using auxil-
iary data on electricity generation units from the Carbon Monitoring for Action project
(carma.org) published by the Center for Global Development, Washington DC.
The second column of table 2 presents the event coefficient for each firm, while columns
3-5 summarize some key characteristics of the firms. When one bores down into the detailed
characteristics of a firm, as is more easily done within the electricity sector, some suggestive
patterns begin to emerge. In general, the biggest declines were concentrated within firms
who produce electricity with relatively low CO2 emissions, such as the hydro or nuclear
intensive firms Fortum, British Energy, and Electricite de France. Some coal intensive
firms such as Drax and RWE registered declines, but they were more modest than those of
the “clean” producers. Last network operators such as National Grid and Red Electrica,
with no position in the production or sale of electricity, registered almost no impact.
These results are consistent with an explanation of the effects that emphasizes the
importance of revenue impacts in the product markets. All the firms in Table 2 who sell
bulk electricity experienced declines in revenues, and only some experienced significant
declines in production costs. Many of these firms were also substantial holders of emissions
permits at the time of the crash in permit prices. In the following section we develop
several more general indices meant to capture the relative sector level and firm specific
characteristics that could influence the permit price effects and test their relevance on
market returns during this event period.
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4 Testing Determinants of Profitability
In this section, we examine which industry and firm characteristics determine the prof-
itability of some firms in the face of CO2 price changes. First we test the importance of
firms’ allocation of permits, net of emissions, in determining abnormal returns. Then we
test whether the share price changes described in the previous section are consistent with
a “revenue effect.”
4.1 Asset Value of Permit Holdings
We first examine the effect of permit allocation, and emissions on the performance of
share prices during the event. For this task we utilize the emissions data contained in
the EU’s Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). This dataset contains facility
level information on the allocation and emissions of over 12,000 facilities throughout the
EU. Unfortunately, firm ownership of facilities is reported inconsistently within the CITL,
making necessary a manual matching of facilities to firms, and then to individual stock
listings.
We were able to match 90 publicly-traded firms in the largest sectors regulated by
the ETS. For each of these firms, we take total 2005 emissions and permit allocations
aggregated over all covered facilities owned by the firms.
We examine whether these firms’ permit allocations and emissions explain abnormal
returns. Given a drop in permit prices, those firms with positive net permit positions will
lose more profits than others with a negative net position, all else equal. In theory this
will be reflected in the stock price. We test this by estimating the following equation:
γ̂ij = θj + µ(Ai − Ei)/Mi + ηij, (6)
where Ai be the historic 2005 allocation, Ei be historic 2005 emissions (as measured in
the spring of 2006), and Mi is the firm’s historic market cap in Euros (e.g., on April 25,
15
2006). In order to control for industry average differences, we examine including industry
fixed effects.
Note that, although the CITL registers all transactions, only the allocations and emis-
sions data are currently publicly available. Therefore we do not know the actual holdings
of a given firm on any day, only their initial allocations. Our values for (A − E) should
be considered only proxies for the “true” net position of firms at the time of the event.
Importantly, the broader market also did not know these “true” net position, and was
relying upon the same data, which were finalized on May 15, that we utilize here.
The net permit position (Ai − Ei) is normalized by market capitalization. This is
done because larger firms could have greater variation of net permits. Furthermore, this
normalization implies a µ coefficient of the change in market capitalization given a change
in net permits.
If profit impacts were driven completely by net emissions costs, we hypothesize that
the coefficient µ would equal roughly the drop in permit price times three, or about -42.
A firm with, say, 1 million tonnes of excess permits in 2005 may be expected to have extra
permits in 2006 and 2007. The value of these unused permits fell by the drop in the permit
price, which was around 15 Euros per tonne. Hence, this hypothetical firm would have
lost, 1 million tons/year * 3 years * -14 Euro, or 42 million Euros.
Table 3 reports the results. We find that the coefficient on net position is statistically
significantly different from -42. In fact, we do not even find a statistically significant
coefficient. In Panel A, we exclude fixed effects and find a coefficient of -6.9 that is
insignificant. Even after controlling for industry fixed effects, in Panels B and C, we find
a very similar result (negative and insignificant).
Given the lack of market information about permit trading, investors were unlikely to
know the exact net position of firms, and may have had difficulty even estimating the sign
of net position. Figure 3, which plots the 90 firms’ permit allocation and emissions during
2005, demonstrates this point. Many firms had been allocated permits that were very
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highly correlated with their 2005 emissions levels. We find that initial allocation explains
over 95 percent of the variation in 2005 emissions.
In Table 3, we next examine whether the abnormal returns were correlated with a firm’s
level of emissions, or allocations. We find no evidence of this in Panel A. However, the
picture becomes more clear once we control for industry fixed effects. As described above,
many industry classifications were “long” in permits during this period. The important
exception is the power industry which was on net short of permits. We therefore estimate
the power industry, as the one segment known to be short, separately in Panel B. In Panel
C, we estimate the influence firm-level emissions and allocations on all other industries,
controlling for industry fixed effects.
With industry fixed effects a clear distinction between the power sector and other
industries emerges. Within the power sector, firms with high levels of emissions outper-
formed the “cleaner” firms when the allowances prices fell. There is a strong relationship
between emissions and changes in market capitalization, with each ton of emissions im-
proving market cap by 6.25 Euros. Firms with higher allocations also had better returns,
but recall that emissions and allocations are almost completely co-linear, so this is likely
also an emissions effect. Firms in the other industrial sectors, which were net long on
permits, experienced the opposite effect. Firms with higher allocations suffered the largest
declines when the permit price fell, with each added ton of allocation implying a reduction
of 31.5 Euros in market capitalization. As with the power sector, both emissions and
allowances produce nearly identical coefficients, reflecting the strong correlation of these
two variables.
This firm-level analysis of permit holdings and emissions implies that, within industries
that were net long on permits, dirtier firms suffered the largest declines. This is consistent
with a market expectation that these firms had suffered the largest decrease in aggregate
permit asset value, as these firms were the largest holders of permits within their industries,
and their asset values in permits exceeded their emissions liabilities. For the power sector,
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it is the cleanest firms that suffer the most. This is consistent with a market focus on
the impact of permit values on electricity prices, combined with a view that dirtier firms
experienced a net decline in their abatement costs to somewhat offset the decline in product
prices. These dirty firms in the power sector still experienced abnormal negative returns,
but they were more modest declines than those of the cleaner firms.
4.2 Tests of Revenue Effects
Recall from Section ?? that the revenue effect depends on how a cost shock in an industry
affects the output prices, ∂p/∂τ . This in turn will depend upon the elasticity of demand
for the product, the convexity of a firm’s costs with respect to emissions costs, and the
relative emissions of other firms in the industry. For example, industries that have little
international trade exposure, use many dirty inputs, and produce substantial carbon emis-
sions are more likely to have a strong revenue effect. In order to test the importance of
these factors, we examine the abnormal returns during the event window as estimated in
equation ??, γ̂i.
γ̂ij = δ0 + δ11(DOj > 0) + δ2DOj + δ31(DIj > 0) (7)
+δ4DIj + δ51(TEj > 0) + δ6TEj + νij,
where DOj is a measure of how dirty (carbon intensive) is an industry’s output, DIj is a
measure of how dirty are an industry’s inputs, and TEj measures the trade exposure of
the industry. We describe each of these variables in more detail below.
Sectors were characterized by the “dirty output,” “dirty input,” and “trade exposure”
variables at the NAICS 3-digit level. Dirty output (DO) comes from combining CITL
emissions data with Thomson’s Datastream financial data. For all sectors j where at least







where Emiti is the sum of facility level emissions in the CITL over all facilities owned
by firm i and Si is the 2005 revenue of firm i. The subscript j indexes NAICS3 sectors,
and CITL indexes firms contained in the CITL emissions data set. The emissions factor
calculated above is then normalized to the 0-1 range. Emissions intensity for any firm in a
given NAICS sector will therefore be based upon the measured emissions of firms matched
with CITL data in that NAICS sector. There were 90 firms for whom we have been able
to match with the facility level emissions data, and 202 firms contained in the STOXX
600 index drawn from the sectors for which we have matched emissions data.
Dirty input comes from input-output tables of industrial activity. DIj is the direct plus
indirect input use of the electricity sector in producing one dollar of output in sector N .
We are not aware of sources of input output tables for the EU with NAICS nomenclature,
so the index here is calculated using US figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). As with DO, we normalize the value of DI to range between 0 and 1.
Trade Exposure (TE) is a measure of how much a given commodity is internationally
traded. We use a measure of Trade Exposure that the European Union has proposed to





EXPORTS and IMPORTS are with respect to the EU region, so intra-EU trade (which
is uniformly under the ETS) is not counted. US trade (from COMTRADE) and produc-
tion (from BEA) data was used to construct these measures. Though European data is
preferable, US data should be equivalent if US and European input-output tables and
9Convery, et al., 2008
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trade profiles are similar. US data were used because they were already coded to NAICS,
whereas European data are categorized by NACE codes, which require further (imperfect)
translation to NAICS via correspondence tables.
Table 4 provides the summary statistics for twenty sectors (based on two-digit NAICS
codes). For each sector, the table reports average abnormal returns during the event
window. In addition, the sectors’ industry characteristics (DOj, DIj, and TEj) as well
as the market capitalization are summarized. The mining, oil and natural gas extraction
sector is that which is most electricity intensive: it had the largest average abnormal stock
drop of approximately 2.7 percent. Utilities have the highest carbon emissions intensity:
its average stocks had an abnormal decline of about 1.8 percent.
Note that for each of these variables there are many sectors with no value. For DO
this is because many industries are not covered under the cap and trade system. In the
sample of 600 firms, roughly 40% are in industries covered by the ETS and therefore have
non-zero values for DO. In the case of DI, there are some (roughly five percent) firms
with NAICS codes not contained in the BEA input-output tables. In the case of trade
exposure, this is an artifact of our reliance on trade and production data. These data are
focused on the manufacturing sectors, and therefore several industries, particularly service
oriented ones, are not considered to be involved in international trade. About 60% of the
600 firms have no value for trade exposure. It is because of these issues that we include
dummy variables that are applied to all firms with non-zero values for DO, DI, and TE
respectively in the specification described above.
Table 5 reports the results of different variations of regression ??. The first two columns
report the results controlling only for dirty output, or dirty input respectively. The third
column controls only for trade exposure. The fourth and fifth columns interact DI and
DO with trade exposure, under the intuition that trade exposure should matter less in
relatively “clean” industries that are unaffected by CO2 prices. Column seven combines
all these variables by interacting both DO and DI with trade exposure.
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From table 5, it is clear there is a relationship between carbon intensity and perfor-
mance during the event window. Firms from industries with high emissions (large DO) or
relatively dirty inputs (e.g., high electricity usage) saw their share prices decline. This is
suggestive of a revenue effect, as firms in these industries will have experienced a decline
in their competitor’s, as well as their own, marginal costs. When DI is interacted with
trade exposure, the coefficient on DI roughly doubles, suggesting that it was firms with
no trade exposure who are largely driving the negative value on DI. The interaction term
on DI and TE is positive, but very imprecisely estimated. When all terms are considered
simultaneously, higher values of both DO and DI significantly impact a decline in share
prices during the event.
It might at first seem counter-intuitive that the firms most directly impacted by CO2
regulations would be the greatest losers from a decline in CO2 prices. Keep in mind that
these values are measuring the relative carbon intensities of industries, not the individ-
ual firms within industries. Thus we interpret these results as being consistent with the
hypothesis that product prices, and therefore revenues, were negatively impacted by the
CO2 price shock. Although costs were also reduced, either through the direct or indirect
exposure to CO2 regulation, it appears that the revenue effects were stronger. For regu-
lated industries, this is almost certainly a consequence of the fact that allocations were
closely linked to emissions, as illustrated above. For these firms, the revenue effects would
naturally be the strongest as the reductions in costs are largely offset by a concurrent
reduction in the value of permit holdings.
We examine the robustness of these results in several ways. One question is the ap-
propriate time window for the event. This is particularly true as the volatility in permit
prices continued beyond the 3 day window examined above. To address this question we
also exam a 30 day event window we call BIGEV ENT , consisting of 5 days prior and 25
days after April 25, 2006. We generate new γ̂i estimates using the BIGEV ENT window
and perform the same analysis on the influences on share price performance. Table 6
describes the results for these regressions. As before, both DI and DO produce negative,
21
although insignificant, coefficients when considered on their own. When all factors are
included (column 7), the coefficients for dirty inputs and dirty outputs are negative and
significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the impacts of trade exposure are much stronger
than during the shorter event window. While firms with trade exposure in general saw
a decline in shares, the interaction terms for both DO and DI are positive and at least
weakly significant. This indicates that although dirty firms saw a decline in shares overall,
the dirtiest firms that were most exposed to international trade benefitted from the CO2
price decline.
In Table 7, we add a measure of the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. Note that the net
present value of all future profits equal the sum of equity and debt. By including the
debt-equity ratio, we test the robustness of our results that the findings are representative
of changes in profits, not just equity. Although debt-to-equity is a significant factor, it
does not change the underlying picture with regards to dirty inputs and outputs during
the short event window. In Table 8, we test the importance of the CAPM framework to
the results by testing the event on the unadjusted returns (e.g. no β term) of the shares.
The results are very similar to those of table 5.
In Table 9, we test for the presence of possible spillovers to a neighboring market by
performing a similar analysis for the stocks in the US Standard and Poors 500 index. When
all factors are considered, the only variable with a significant impact on returns is the DO
index variable, which is positive, indicating that dirty firms experienced an increase during
this period. One possible interpretation is that the event in the EU lowered expectations
about the probability or the cost of future regulation in the US. In Table 10 we analyze
a similar time frame from the year 2004, a date before the EU CO2 market came into
existence, as a form of falsification test. Although certain characteristics were significant
in determining the abnormal returns of shares during this 2004 period, the results are quite
different from the results from the 2006 CO2 price crash.
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5 Conclusions
The development and application of any significant new environmental regulation will
involve some level of debate over its economic impacts. This is particularly true in the
case of regulations to combat climate change because the stakes are so high. The annual
value of permits consumed in the European ETS market we study reached nearly $60
Billion. A market in the United States would be 2 to 3 times the size of the European
market. These values are an order of magnitude larger than any other previous emissions
trading markets. These sums have generated intense interest in the potential incidence
of these costs, and many industries are making the case for some form of free permit
allocation to offset these costs.
However, the cost impact is only one part of the story from the perspective of firms and
industries. The impact of emissions costs on revenues is another critical consideration. It a
desire to examine this full portfolio of impacts that has drawn us to examine the European
ETS market. We have used an event-study approach to analyze the response of the stock
market to the devaluation of CO2 permit prices in late April 2006. This provides one of the
first opportunities to empirically test the impacts of CO2 regulation on major industries
and firms. By looking at the impact of a sharp decline in CO2 prices on the equity prices
of impacted firms, we can get a strong sense of what the market believes to be the net
impacts of CO2 regulations.
The story that emerges from an examination of this event is that the equity markets
were strongly focused on revenue effects. Our results demonstrate, fairly robustly, that
the share prices of firms from the “dirtiest” industries experienced the largest abnormal
declines during this period. For firms that are directly regulated under the ETS program,
consideration of permit holdings almost certainly influenced investor response. Although
our data on allocations appear insufficient to explicitly identify a “net holdings” effect, we
do find evidence that allocations played a role in the market’s response to the CO2 price
crash.
23
Within the power sector, which was as a whole “short” of permits, the share prices
of firms with the highest emissions rates, perform better than the “cleaner” firms within
this sector. The share prices of many of these high emissions firms did experience abnor-
mal declines, but these declines were less severe than those of their low carbon intensity
competitors. The fact that very low-carbon emissions firms declined the most gives strong
indication of the market’s focus on how declining CO2 prices would reduce the revenues
of these firms through lower electricity prices. The fact that the high emissions firms still
experienced declines highlights the fact that the market also understood that these firms
were holding large portfolios of allowances and experienced a loss in that portfolio that
largely offset their cost savings from lower CO2 prices. Within other industries that were
in aggregate allocated more allowances than were consumed, those firms with the largest
allowances experienced the largest abnormal declines.
It is important to recognize the many caveats that must be applied to interpreting
these results. The ETS was a very new market, which was one of the causes of the volatil-
ity we utilize here. It would be heroic to assume that the stock market completely and
accurately processed the information that emerged in late April 2006. In addition, while
the crash affected both near-term and long-term CO2 prices, the impact on the near-term
Phase I prices was much more pronounced. The events of 2006 may also have impacted
expectations about future allocations of emissions permits, as well as expectations about
prices. Because our event study uses the same time window for all stocks, any contempo-
raneous events could also be causing the abnormal returns. We looked for sector-specific
announcements in this period. Specifically, oil prices did not change dramatically.
Nonetheless, these results are largely consistent with what simulation studies had pre-
dicted could be the case for many of these industries. These studies forecast an increase
in revenues that would largely offset the increase in regulatory costs. In fact, our results
imply that for clean firms in dirty industries, these revenue effects are larger than cost
increases. These are important facts to bear in mind when setting policies regarding allo-
cations to impacted industries. In many cases, those directly or even indirectly impacted
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Figure 1: Theoretical Change in Producer Surplus under Environmental Regulation. 
Under a tax, or auctioned permits, firms gain area A but lose areas B and C. 
However, if firms are allocated permits equal to their equilibrium emissions, they 








Figure 2: EU Carbon Prices, Stock Index, and Oil Prices 
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Figure 3: Most firms’ allowances similar to emissions (Current subsample of 90 firms with emissions linked to stock market data) 
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Table 1: Stock Market Cumulative Returns by Industry  
             Cumulative Abnormal Returns           Cumulative Returns 
NAICS Sector Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   
21 Mining & Oil/Gas Extraction -0.0273 (0.0060) *** -0.0358 (0.0069) *** 
22 Utilities -0.0179 (0.0056) *** -0.0211 (0.0001) *** 
53 Real Estate & Rental -0.0132 (0.0048) *** -0.0169 (0.0023) *** 
23 Construction -0.0115 (0.0073)  -0.0188 (0.0033) *** 
72 Accommodation & Food Services -0.0081 (0.0058)  -0.0117 (0.0058) ** 
33 Manufacturing (Metals, Machinery) -0.0068 (0.0033) ** -0.0143 (0.0033) *** 
45 Retail (General, Misc) -0.0059 (0.0022) *** -0.0098 (0.0001) *** 
31 Food & Textiles -0.0053 (0.0034)  -0.0096 (0.0015) *** 
54 Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services -0.0052 (0.0059)  -0.0119 (0.0059)  
32 Manufacturing (Paper, Plastics) -0.0032 (0.0037)  -0.0092 (0.0037) ** 
99 Other -0.0016 (0.0088)  -0.0083 (0.0094)  
48 Transportation -0.0001 (0.0051)  -0.0052 (0.0051)  
51 Information 0.0002 (0.0032)  -0.0067 (0.0037) * 
52 Finance & Insurance 0.0008 (0.0018)  -0.0061 (0.0008) *** 
44 Retail (Electronics, Gas, Health) 0.0019 (0.0047)  -0.0043 (0.0059)  
71 Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation 0.0043 (0.0101)  -0.0011 (0.0099)  
62 Health Care & Social Assistance 0.0110 (0.0030) *** 0.0059 (0.0031) * 
56 Administrative & Support 0.0130 (0.0064) ** 0.0048 (0.0064)  
49 Couriers & Storage 0.0139 (0.0068) ** 0.0090 (0.0072)  
42 Wholesale Trade 0.0166 (0.0067) ** 0.0098 (0.0058) * 
 All Sectors -0.0045 (0.0015) *** -0.0108 (0.0015) *** 
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 2: Stock Market Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Firms in the Electricity Sector 
 
Panel A. Firm Level Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 







Fortum -0.088 0.214 0.265 1.236 
Verbundgesellschaft -0.086 0.252 0.941 3.729 
British Energy Group -0.071 0.108 1.117 10.365 
EDF -0.050 0.104 0.466 4.496 
RWE (XET) -0.045 0.909 3.049 3.355 
A2A -0.024 0.287 0.360 1.255 
Atel Holding 'R' -0.022 0.213   
DRAX Group -0.019 1.046 3.854 3.684 
United Utilities Group -0.018    
EDP Energias de Portugal -0.015 0.712 1.809 2.541 
International Power -0.012 0.611 2.084 3.414 
Red Electrica de Espana -0.005    
Scot.& Southern Energy -0.004 0.819 1.920 2.344 
ENEL -0.003 0.501 1.466 2.926 
National Grid -0.001    
Terna -0.001    
Union Fenosa 0.004 0.972 1.265 1.301 
Schneider Electric 0.011    
Iberdrola 0.015 0.349 0.451 1.291 
Public Power 0.052 0.982 8.000 8.146 
 
Panel B. Correlations 





Carbon per MWh 0.593 1.000  
Carbon per Equity 0.580 0.689 1.000 




Table 3: Tests of Net Permits at Firm Level  
 
Panel A: All Industries (with NAICS3 Fixed Effects) 
 1   2   3   4   
         
Net Permits -6.90        
 (7.18)        
Allocation   4.17    0.26  
   (3.57)    (14.15)  
Emissions     4.10  3.85  
     (3.22)  (10.90)  
Constant F.E.   F.E.   F.E.   F.E.   
 
Panel B: Industries Net Short in Permits (Power Industry) 
 1   2   3   4   
         
Net Permits -1.51        
 (11.44)        
Allocation   6.65 ***   16.35  
   (1.32)    (11.28)  
Emissions     6.25 *** -9.45  
     (1.50)  (11.14)  
Constant -0.022 ** -0.031 *** -0.031 *** -0.030 *** 
 (0.008)   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.008)   
 
Panel C: Industries Net Long in Permits (with NAICS3 Fixed Effects) 
 1   2   3   4   
         
Net Permits -17.11        
 (29.18)        
Allocation   -31.53 ***   -6.73  
   (6.81)    (20.24)  
Emissions     -34.56 *** -27.64  
     (6.79)  (17.58)  
Constant F.E.   F.E.   F.E.   F.E.   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors 
are robust. There are 90 observations in Panel A, 21 in Panel B, and 69 in Panel 
C. Firms in the power industry had an average net short position of 2.15 million 
while firms in other industries were on average net long by 282 thousand. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
Sector N Event Return Dirty Output Dirty   Input Trade Exposure Market Cap 
Mining & Oil/Gas Extraction 23 -2.73% 0.08 0.39 0.58 15,400,000,000 
Utilities 28 -1.79% 0.97 0.04 n/a 18,900,000,000 
Real Estate & Rental 21 -1.32% n/a 0.14 n/a 4,870,000,000 
Construction 28 -1.15% 0.00 0.10 n/a 6,680,000,000 
Accommodation & Food Services 8 -0.81% n/a 0.24 n/a 7,050,000,000 
Manufacturing (Metals, Machinery) 100 -0.68% 0.05 0.22 0.52 9,950,000,000 
Retail (General, Misc) 5 -0.59% n/a n/a n/a 27,500,000,000 
Food & Textiles 34 -0.53% n/a 0.24 0.26 18,800,000,000 
Professional, Scientific, & Technical Services 21 -0.52% 0.00 0.03 n/a 4,270,000,000 
Manufacturing (Paper, Plastics) 65 -0.32% 0.10 0.30 0.35 30,100,000,000 
Other 7 -0.16% 0.35 n/a n/a 31,900,000,000 
Transportation 23 -0.01% 0.03 0.09 n/a 6,610,000,000 
Information 47 0.02% n/a 0.05 n/a 18,600,000,000 
Finance & Insurance 121 0.08% n/a 0.01 n/a 22,100,000,000 
Retail (Electronics, Gas, Health) 16 0.19% 0.09 n/a n/a 11,900,000,000 
Arts, Entertainment, & Recreation 4 0.43% n/a 0.22 n/a 6,140,000,000 
Health Care & Social Assistance 2 1.10% n/a 0.09 n/a 6,830,000,000 
Administrative & Support 8 1.30% n/a 0.03 n/a 5,530,000,000 
Couriers & Storage 3 1.39% n/a 0.13 n/a 16,600,000,000 
Wholesale Trade 8 1.66% n/a 0.05 n/a 5,050,000,000 
 
Notes: The table reports the sample mean for each two digit NAICS sector. Dirty Output is ratio of industry’s emissions share to 
industry’s equity share, Dirty Input is electricity costs over sales, Trade exposure is the ratio of the sum of imports and exports 
over the sum of imports and sales, and market cap is equity value in $1000s. 
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Table 5: Tests of Revenue Effects at Industry Level 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   -0.0034        -0.0016  -0.0005  
   (0.0029)        (0.0026)  (0.0023)  
               
DO Index   -0.0119 ***       -0.0131 *** -0.0142 *** 
   (0.0031)        (0.0035)  (0.0039)  
               
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0010    -0.0002    -0.0004  
 
    (0.0043)    (0.0045)    (0.0045)  
               
DI Index     -0.0237 **   -0.0520 **   -0.0526 * 
     (0.0109)    (0.0248)    (0.0268)  
               
Trade Exposure Indicator       -0.0044  0.0069  -0.0042  0.0068  
 
      (0.0038)  (0.0056)  (0.0038)  (0.0058)  
               
Trade Index       0.0023  -0.0108  0.0036  -0.0124  
       (0.0041)  (0.0118)  (0.0067)  (0.0120)  
               
DI*Trade Index         0.0494    0.0564  
         (0.0430)    (0.0506)  
               
DO*Trade Index           -0.0259  -0.0069  
           (0.0279)  (0.0326)  
               
Constant -0.0045 *** -0.0022  -0.0004  -0.0032  -0.0004  -0.0017  0.0012  
  (0.0015)   (0.0017)   (0.0039)   (0.0020)   (0.0039)   (0.0019)   (0.0043)   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 6: Robustness to Big Event Window 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   -0.0034        0.0036  0.0027  
   (0.0074)        (0.0075)  (0.0072)  
               
DO Index   -0.0120 *       -0.0210 ** -0.0203 ** 
   (0.0067)        (0.0080)  (0.0079)  
               
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0227    -0.0156    -0.0153  
 
    (0.0174)    (0.0175)    (0.0167)  
               
DI Index     -0.0139    -0.0977 **   -0.1012 ** 
     (0.0169)    (0.0469)    (0.0485)  
               
Trade Exposure Indicator       -0.0033  0.0177  -0.0050  0.0167  
 
      (0.0090)  (0.0118)  (0.0088)  (0.0119)  
               
Trade Index       -0.0173  -0.0775 ** -0.0197  -0.0800 ** 
       (0.0247)  (0.0369)  (0.0223)  (0.0360)  
               
DI*Trade Index         0.2392 **   0.2547 ** 
         (0.1057)    (0.1201)  
               
DO*Trade Index           0.0248  -0.0397  
           (0.1539)  (0.1357)  
               
Constant -0.0136 *** -0.0113 ** 0.0098  -0.0095 ** 0.0098  -0.0086 * 0.0108  
  (0.0035)   (0.0046)   (0.0169)   (0.0041)   (0.0169)   (0.0044)   (0.0161)   
  
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 7: Robustness to Including Debt-Equity Ratio Control 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   -0.0026        -0.0011  -0.0001  
   (0.0029)        (0.0025)  (0.0023)  
DO Index   -0.0120 ***       -0.0129 *** -0.0140 *** 
   (0.0031)        (0.0036)  (0.0039)  
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0016    -0.0010    -0.0010  
 
    (0.0044)    (0.0047)    (0.0046)  
DI Index     -0.0221 **   -0.0475 *   -0.0489 * 
     (0.0110)    (0.0251)    (0.0270)  
Trade Exposure Indicator       -0.0042  0.0062  -0.0042  0.0061  
 
      (0.0039)  (0.0057)  (0.0039)  (0.0058)  
Trade Index       0.0031  -0.0081  0.0044  -0.0101  
       (0.0041)  (0.0121)  (0.0067)  (0.0121)  
DI*Trade Index         0.0416    0.0496  
         (0.0436)    (0.0509)  
DO*Trade Index           -0.0276  -0.0076  
           (0.0277)  (0.0321)  
Debt-Equity Ratio 0.0011 *** 0.0009 ** 0.0007 ** 0.0010 ** 0.0007 * 0.0008 ** 0.0006  
 (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  
Constant -0.0052 *** -0.0031 * -0.0005  -0.0041 * -0.0005  -0.0026  0.0009  
  (0.0016)   (0.0018)   (0.0039)   (0.0021)   (0.0039)   (0.0021)   (0.0043)   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 8: Robustness to no CAPM (Cumulative returns) 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   -0.0044        -0.0025  -0.0013  
   (0.0031)        (0.0028)  (0.0025)  
               
DO Index   -0.0084 **       -0.0096 *** -0.0108 *** 
   (0.0034)        (0.0035)  (0.0038)  
               
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0011    -0.0005    -0.0008  
 
    (0.0037)    (0.0039)    (0.0038)  
               
DI Index     -0.0258 **   -0.0501 **   -0.0502 * 
     (0.0111)    (0.0240)    (0.0258)  
               
Trade Exposure Indicator       -0.0032  0.0078  -0.0026  0.0080  
 
      (0.0040)  (0.0056)  (0.0038)  (0.0056)  
               
Trade Index       -0.0018  -0.0127  0.0000  -0.0139  
       (0.0047)  (0.0118)  (0.0072)  (0.0122)  
               
DI*Trade Index         0.0406    0.0468  
         (0.0419)    (0.0486)  
               
DO*Trade Index           -0.0310  -0.0080  
           (0.0287)  (0.0326)  
               
Constant -0.0108 *** -0.0084 *** -0.0063 * -0.0093 *** -0.0063 * -0.0079 *** -0.0048  
  (0.0015)   (0.0016)   (0.0033)   (0.0018)   (0.0033)   (0.0017)   (0.0036)   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 9: Spillovers to the United States (data from S&P 500) 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   -0.0090        -0.0049  -0.0052  
   (0.0073)        (0.0066)  (0.0066)  
               
DO Index   0.0161 **       0.0139 * 0.0138 * 
   (0.0066)        (0.0075)  (0.0081)  
               
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0037    -0.0011    -0.0023  
 
    (0.0055)    (0.0068)    (0.0075)  
               
DI Index     -0.0313 *   -0.0712    -0.0696  
     (0.0163)    (0.0486)    (0.0493)  
               
Trade Exposure Indicator       -0.0020  0.0116  0.0022  0.0154  
 
      (0.0086)  (0.0100)  (0.0081)  (0.0101)  
               
Trade Index       -0.0098  -0.0318  -0.0073  -0.0341 * 
       (0.0130)  (0.0206)  (0.0101)  (0.0193)  
               
DI*Trade Index         0.0951    0.1216  
         (0.0858)    (0.0848)  
               
DO*Trade Index           -0.1632 * -0.1593  
           (0.0927)  (0.1014)  
               
Constant -0.0060 ** -0.0041  0.0014  -0.0028  0.0014  -0.0035  0.0017  
  (0.0029)   (0.0034)   (0.0034)   (0.0040)   (0.0035)   (0.0047)   (0.0035)   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 572 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
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Table 10: Counterfactual Event Study for April 2004. 
 
 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
               
Dirty Output Indicator   0.0009        -0.0027  -0.0023  
   (0.0044)        (0.0035)  (0.0033)  
               
DO Index   -0.0040        0.0005  -0.0001  
   (0.0067)        (0.0045)  (0.0041)  
               
Dirty Input Indicator     -0.0055 **   -0.0069 ***   -0.0072 *** 
 
    (0.0026)    (0.0025)    (0.0027)  
               
DI Index     0.0052    -0.0159    -0.0148  
     (0.0146)    (0.0302)    (0.0307)  
               
Trade Exposure Indicator       0.0226 *** 0.0269 *** 0.0236 *** 0.0275 *** 
 
      (0.0065)  (0.0092)  (0.0067)  (0.0094)  
               
Trade Index       -0.0367 *** -0.0354 * -0.0349 *** -0.0354 * 
       (0.0109)  (0.0182)  (0.0121)  (0.0190)  
               
DI*Trade Index         -0.0066    -0.0047  
         (0.0476)    (0.0505)  
               
DO*Trade Index           -0.0248  -0.0041  
           (0.0301)  (0.0376)  
               
Constant -0.0027  -0.0028  0.0019  -0.0052 *** 0.0019  -0.0046 *** 0.0027  
  (0.0018)   (0.0018)   (0.0014)   (0.0014)   (0.0014)   (0.0016)   (0.0019)   
 
Notes: Significance is noted at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Standard errors are robust. There are 531 observations. 
Industry is by NAICS. 
